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Abstract
Background: Influenza super-strains can emerge through recombination of strains from birds, pigs, and humans.
However, once a new recombinant strain emerges, it is not clear whether the strain is capable of sustaining an
outbreak. In certain cases, such strains have caused major influenza pandemics.
Methods: Here we develop a multi-host (i.e., birds, pigs, and humans) and multi-strain model of influenza to
analyze the outcome of emergent strains. In the model, pigs act as “mixing vessels” for avian and human strains
and can produce super-strains from genetic recombination.
Results: We find that epidemiological outcomes are predicted by three factors: (i) contact between pigs and
humans, (ii) transmissibility of the super-strain in humans, and (iii) transmissibility from pigs to humans. Specifically,
outbreaks will reoccur when the super-strain infections are less frequent between humans (e.g., R0=1.4) but
frequent from pigs to humans, and a large-scale outbreak followed by successive dampening outbreaks will occur
when super-strain infections are frequent between humans (e.g., R0=2.3). The average time between the initial
outbreak and the first resurgence varies from 41 to 82 years. We determine the largest outbreak will occur when
2.3 <R0 < 3.8 and the highest cumulative infections occur when 0 <R0 < 3.0 and is dependent on the frequency of
pig-to-human infections for lower R0 values (0 <R0 < 1.9).
Conclusions: Our results provide insights on the effect of species interactions on the dynamics of influenza super-
strains. Counter intuitively, epidemics may occur in humans even if the transmissibility of a super-strain is low.
Surprisingly, our modeling shows strains that have generated past epidemics (e.g., H1N1) could resurge decades
after they have apparently disappeared.
Background
Until very recently there has been limited attention
focused on the role of pigs in the spread of influenza and
even less on the possibility of recombination of avian and
human viruses in pigs [1-4]. The emergence of the novel
strain of influenza A (H1N1) in Mexico [5,6] in April
2009 has shown birds, pigs and humans can all play a
role in the formation of new strains and can be trans-
mitted from pigs to humans [7]. Prior to the outbreak,
much of the surveillance against pandemic influenza has
been focused on avian strains (e.g., H5N1).
Influenza pandemics occur when a transmissible strain
emerges into the human population in which humans
have little or no immunity. One way this can occur is
when a strain emerges in humans from a reservoir host
species (e.g., birds or pigs). In fact, the three previous
influenza pandemics (1918 H1N1, 1957 H2N2, and 1968
H3N2) emerged to humans from a non-human reservoir
and were subtypes that originated in avian hosts [7]. In
fact, strong evidence suggests all influenza subtypes trace
back to avian origin, implying the avian virus emerged and
established itself in mammals from birds. Avian strains
such as the H5N1 have proven to be the most threatening
particularly to humans upon infection, killing approxi-
mately 50 to 70 percent of those infected [8]. An H5N1
pandemic appears unlikely in that the strain has been
shown to transmit poorly between humans. Furthermore,
a strain with such high virulence would also need to be
highly transmissible in order for a pandemic to occur.
Genetic changes in influenza provide new opportunities
for pathogen emergence in humans, particularly through
recombination. When coinfection occurs, two strains may
interact and recombine to form a new reassortant strain.
Intermediate hosts, such as pigs and domestic poultry,
play an important role in influenza infection between
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human influenza viruses [9]. It has been reported that pigs
are capable of infecting humans [4,10,11] and are likely
candidates as intermediate hosts for coinfection of inter-
species strains [12].
Several empirical studies indicate that not only avian
and human influenza strains are likely to establish infec-
tion in pigs but also that pigs are capable of passing
newly reassortant strains to humans. Strikingly, half of
Java’s pigs in 2005 were reported to be infected with
avian influenza H5N1 [13]. In 1999, a strain of avian
origin (H4N6) was isolated from pigs in Canadian swine
farms [14]. Furthermore, the previously known H1N1
swine virus emerging in Europe in 1979 was antigeni-
cally similar to avian strains [4]. The avian virus is more
likely to establish infection in swine [15,16]. Evidence
for human strains being transmitted to swine was docu-
mented when a swine flu H1N2 outbreak in Japan’s pigs
was determined to be a result of reassortment between
swine H3N2 and human H1N1 [17].
Mathematical models have been used to predict epi-
demics and develop intervention strategies [18-20]; how-
ever, these models have not been developed to include
both recombination and cross-species transmission. Here
we present a theoretical model that tracks influenza trans-
mission dynamics within and among three species (i.e.,
birds, pigs, and humans). The model describes how new
“super-strains” (i.e., strains that are highly virulent to
humans) can arise if pigs act as “mixing vessels” for the
recombination of species-specific strains. We use the
model to determine the epidemiological outcomes of a
reassortant super-strain by varying the factors that influ-
ence the strain’s incidence in humans (i.e., transmissibility
within humans, pig-to-human transmissibility, and pig-to-
human contact). Furthermore, we determine the state(s)
(or parameter ranges) of a super-strain that will result in
(i) the greatest single epidemic and (ii) the highest cumula-
tive prevalence.
Methods
To study the emergence of super-strains from interspe-
cies sources, we have constructed a novel multi-strain/
multi-host (MSMH) model [21]. This enables the trans-
mission of influenza to be tracked within and between
species. We characterize a super-strain in humans as a
strain that is highly virulent and capable of directly
infecting all humans (i.e., non- and seasonal infected
humans) once the strain emerges. Furthermore, when a
human with the seasonal strain acquires the super-strain,
the super-strain is dominant and there is no coinfection.
We use the model to analyze the consequences of a
super-strain that forms from a highly virulent (but per-
haps non-transmissible) avian strain (e.g., H5N1) and
seasonal human strain. A flow diagram for this model is
shown in Fig. 1. The avian model (signified by subscript
b) consists of susceptibles (Sb)a n di n f e c t i v e s( Ib); the
human model (signified by subscript h) consists of sus-
ceptibles (Sh), seasonal infectives (Ih), and super-strain
infectives (Jh); and the swine model (signified by subscript
p) consists of susceptibles (Sp), seasonal human and avian
strain infectives (Ip,1 and Ip,2, respectively), coinfected
pigs (Ip,12), and infectives that carry a super-strain from
recombination during coinfection (Jp). The three host
species are coupled as an interacting species system,
where the couplings enable avian and human strains to
infect pigs (i.e., pigs act as intermediate hosts) and super-
strains (developed in pigs) to infect humans. A pig coin-
fected with both avian and human strains is a “mixing
vessel” and can produce a super-strain capable of infect-
ing humans. The ten equations that specify the model, as
well as a more detailed description, are given in Section
1 of the Appendix.
We calibrated the MSMH model using data on humans
and swine in Southeast Asia. The two human infectious
classes are parameterized to represent individuals
infected with a seasonal strains (e.g., H1N1 and H3N2)
and a transmissible super-strain with disease virulence
similar to the H5N1 strain (i.e., 68 percent disease-
induced mortality rate) [8]. We chose reasonable para-
meter values for human influenza transmissibility in
Thailand [8,22] and set similar values to sustain prevalent
levels of avian and human reassortants in pigs [21]; see
Section 3 of the Appendix. Population growth parameters
and initial population densities for humans and pigs were
determined from census data in Thailand for the twenti-
eth century; see Section 3 of the Appendix. We assume
the rate in which a coinfected pig produces a super-strain
ψp is 0.1. We define the pig-to-human contact transmissi-
bility gp as the probability per unit time that a super-
strain infected pig will come into contact with and
infected human. That is, gp is a product of two factors: (i)
the rate at which a human will come into contact with a
pig and (ii) the rate at which a pig will successfully infect
a human with the super-strain. Similarly, the parameters
bh,1 and bh,2 are the transmissibility of the seasonal and
super- strains, respectively, to susceptible humans (Sh).
The transmissibility of the super-strain to seasonal
infected humans (or super-transmissibility) is δh,w h i c h
we will assume is equal to bh,2 (i.e., super-strain transmis-
s i o ni st h es a m ef o rs u s c e p t i b l e( Sh) and seasonal infec-
tives (Ih,1)). The basic reproductive number R0 for each
strain is the average number of secondary infections that
one infectious individual can generate in an entirely sus-
ceptible population [23]. The R0’s for endemic strains
(i.e., excluding the super-strain in humans) in each spe-
cies range between 1 and 2.5. We examine R0 values
from 0 to 9.5 for a super-strain in humans [18] together
with pig-to-human contact transmissibility ranging from
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miologically relevant cases for past influenza pandemics.
Results
We simulate the MSMH model over different time peri-
ods (i.e., 200-1000 years) to understand both the initial
impact and long-term consequences of super-strains.
We assume that initially there are neither infected pigs
nor super-infected humans. In other words, an initial
pre-epidemic period occurs before the super-strain
emerges in humans, during which the avian and human
strains can cocirculate in pigs for many years or even
decades before a super-strain emerges in humans (Figs.
2A-D). The initial outbreak is abrupt once the super-
strain emerges in humans and typically has the greatest
magnitude. After a super-strain has emerged in humans,
there are three possible epidemiological outcomes: peri-
odic outbreaks (Figs. 2A-B for approx. gp > 0.15); a
super-strain that sustains at low levels without causing a
significant outbreak (Figs. 2A-B for approx. gp <0 . 1 5 ) ;
or a strong initial epidemic followed by weaker epi-
demics (Figs. 2C-D), where the super-strain replaces a
previously circulating strain. The outcome is determined
by transmissibility of the super-strain and the contact
transmissibility from super-infectious pigs to humans.
T h et i m ef r a m eb e t w e e nt h ef i r s tt w oo u t b r e a k sr a n g e s
from 41 to 82 years, depending on the level of transmis-
sibility (Fig. 3).
When the super-strain is not highly transmissible (i.e.,
less transmissible than seasonal flu) in humans, the
super-strain can cause periodic epidemics in humans
(Figs. 2A-B). For R0=1 . 4 ,p e r i o d i co u t b r e a k so c c u ra t
higher levels of pig-to-human contact transmissibility
(approx. gp > 0.15). In this case, we observe periodic
epidemics in all population classes in both humans
(Fig. 4A), and pigs (Fig. 4B). In addition, recombinant
strains emerge in cycles (cyan: Fig. 4B). The oscillations
in the number of coinfected pigs correlate with those of
pigs infected with each separate strain (Fig. 4B). Super-
infectious pigs attain a maximum number when pigs
infected with the human strain are at a peak (cyan:
Fig. 4B). Smaller outbreaks are more frequent with
lower levels of interaction between pigs and humans,
and larger but less frequent outbreaks occur at higher
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Fig. 1 Schematic diagram illustrating the MSMH model. Susceptibles are denoted by S, infectious classes by I, and super-strain infectious
classes by J. Each species’ classes and parameters for are subscripted by b (birds), h (humans), and p (pigs). All host species have a SIS structure,
where recruitment is logistic of the entire population into the susceptible subclass and transfer from infected subclasses by recovery into the
susceptible subclass or disease-induced death. The birds have a basic structure, humans have a super-infection structure, and pigs have a
coinfection structure with recombination. Solid arrows represent the transfer due to infection within a single host population. Dashed arrows
represent the direction of interspecies infectivity from human-to-pig with the endemic human strain, bird-to-pig with the endemic avian strain,
and pig-to-human with the super-strain. A description of the variables and parameters is given in Sections 1 and 3 of the Appendix.
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strain will eventually stabilize, and outbreaks of both
strains will occur abruptly after interepidemic periods of
virtually no disease prevalence (red: Figs. 4C-D. The
time between the first two outbreaks ranges from
approximately 55 to 81 years and is dependent on the
transmissibility of the super-strain and pig-to-human
contact transmissibility (Fig. 3: blue). These simulations
show the reoccurring nature of pandemics (e.g., the
three major outbreaks of the twentieth century: 1918,
1957, and 1968). It is worth noting that the 1918 virus
spread between pigs and humans [24]; however, it is
unclear whether the virus initially spread from pig-to-
human or human-to-pig.
At lower levels of transmission, we found that super-
strains were continuously produced in the pig popula-
tion, but only sustained at a low level (Figs. 2A-B) so
they did not pose a threat to the human population.
This example correlates to cases when the virus infects
a few but is unable to establish itself after the initial out-
break, e.g., the “New Jersey” Incident in the USA in
1976 [25] and perhaps other outbreaks involving a few
individuals as described in [4].
When the super-strain is highly transmissible (i.e.,
approximately as transmissible as 1918 flu, R0=2.3), the
strain will slowly emerge and cause an “epidemic spike”
in humans (Figs. 2C-D). In this case, the resulting out-
break dynamics are influenced predominately by the
AB
CD
Fig. 2 Time-series figures for the super-infectious humans at varying levels of interaction(A) The simulation illustrates that for low super-
transmissibility (R0=1.4) and varying levels of interaction (gp), the system will exhibit reoccurring outbreaks. (B) Bird’s-eye view of the Fig. 2A shows as
the level of interaction increases, the outbreaks become larger but further apart. (C) The simulation illustrates that for high super-incidence (R0=2.3)
and varying levels of pig-to-human contact transmissibility (gp), the system will exhibit an initial large-scale outbreak that is followed by successively
damping outbreaks. (D) Bird’s-eye view of Fig. 2C shows how varying level of interaction has no effect on the dynamics of the outbreak.
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dampening outbreaks follow the initial spike with peri-
ods of virtually no disease prevalence in humans
between epidemic outbreaks. The super-strain outcom-
petes the preexisting endemic strain, causing the ende-
mic strain to become extinct in humans and hence
disappear from the pigs, eliminating the reoccurrence of
coinfection and recombination. The time frame between
the first two outbreaks ranges from approximately 61 to
69 years (Fig. 3: green). These simulations show features
present in the pandemics of 1918, 1957, and 1968 in
that after the initial pandemic the new super-strain dis-
places the previously dominant strain [26], continues to
circulate, and becomes endemic but with reduced epide-
miological impact.
We compare both the epidemic magnitude and cumu-
lative density for varying levels of pig-to-human contact
transmissibility and super-strain transmission in humans.
By analyzing the largest outbreak for approximately 75
years after the strain has emerged, we determine that a
large scale epidemic will occur when 1.9 <R0 <6 . 6 ;h o w -
ever, the greatest epidemic will occur when 2.3 <R0 <3 . 8
(Fig. 5A) and not when R0 > 3.8. The contact transmissi-
bility does not influence the magnitude of the largest out-
break but is a necessary component for the super-strain
to emerge in humans. We determine that a significant
outbreak is unlikely for R0 < 1.9 and a moderate outbreak
will occur when R0 >6 . 6 .F u r t h e r m o r e ,t h em o s ts i g n i f i -
cant outbreaks (i.e., 2.3 < R0 < 3.8) occur when the
super-strain is highly transmissible, and dampened out-
breaks follow the large-scale epidemic (Figs. 2C-D).
These results for the different values of R0 remain consis-
tent for much longer time frames (e.g., 500 and 1000
years). Our results show that a super-strain that emerges
from pigs to humans typically has the greatest potential
for human mortalities during its initial outbreak.
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Fig. 3 Time between the first and second outbreaks at varying degrees of pig-to-human interaction The transmission of the super-strain
in humans was set at five specific values. Time frames vary for bh,2=0.015 from 41 to 81 years (blue), bh,2=0.0215 from 56 to 82 years (red),
bh,2=0.024 from 61 to 70 years (green), for bh,2=0.04 from 58 to 59 years (black), for bh,2=0.084 from 52 to 54 years (magenta). Overall times
range from 41 to 82 years.
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infections over different time frames shows higher levels
of disease prevalence at lower levels of transmissibility.
For 200 years, highest cumulative number occurs when
0< R0 < 7.6 (Fig. 5B: red-orange), of which there are two
maximal states when 2.5 <R0 < 3.0 and 4.0 <R0 <4 . 5
(Fig. 4B: dark red). In this case, the cumulative number
of infectives can be high even when R0 <1 . 9b u t
depends on the pig-to-human contact transmissibility.
For much longer time frames of 500 years (Fig. 5C: dark
red) and 1000 years (Fig. 5D: dark red), the maximal
prevalence occurs when: 1.9 <R0 < 3.0 for all levels of
interaction, and R0 < 1.9 with a sufficient level of pig-to-
human contact transmissibility. In fact, long-term
prevalence is high even when R0 <1( bh,2 < 0.011) and
the pig-to-human contact transmission is low (gp <0 . 4 ,
where the lower bound of gp is dependent on the value
of R0). Furthermore, the epidemiological outcome can
either be a large-scale outbreak or milder reoccurring
outbreaks to sustain maximal prevalence of a super-
strain.
Conclusions
Cross-species interaction and transmission of influenza
creates a reservoir of super-strains in pigs; therefore, the
continuous introduction of super-strains into humans is
almost inevitable. Our modeling is consistent with this
notion in that it shows how a super-strain is likely to
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Fig. 4 Simulation of the MSMH model for population densities versus time with high pig-to-human contact transmissibility and low
super-strain transmissibility(A) The simulation for the humans. Colors represent densities over time of the susceptible (blue), primary strain
infectious (green), and super-strain infectious (red) classes. (B) The simulation for pigs. Colors represent population densities over time of the
susceptible (blue), human strain infectious (red), avian strain infectious (green), coinfected (cyan), and super-strain infectious (magenta) classes.
(C) Phase portrait for the humans. The figure shows human populations (blue) will reach a positive oscillating state (red). (D) A different view of
the humans’ phase portrait showing the attracting region in 3D space.
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Page 6 of 9emerge in humans from an intermediate host, such as
pigs. However, we have found that, once a super-strain
has emerged, three different outcomes are possible: (i)
large scale outbreak, (ii) milder reoccurring outbreaks,
and (iii) no outbreak. Examples of each types of out-
break have been well observed in nature. Our results
show there may be little to no infectious activity during
interepidemic periods; hence, epidemic forecasting may
be difficult until the early stages of an outbreak. This is
particularly important to ensure vaccine development in
that detection may not be possible until an outbreak is
significant. The more recent 2009 H1N1 strain was a
reassortant of avian, human, and swine strains, and its
gene segments have been circulating undetected for an
extended period [7]. Our results also show that the
greatest outbreak occurs when 2.3 <R0 < 3.8, which may
be a consequence of strain competition and interspecies
infection. That is, pig-to-human infection provides a
competitive advantage to the super-strain over the sea-
sonal. Higher R0 values for the super-strain may result
in competitive exclusion of the seasonal strain, thus sup-
pressing seasonal infections and limiting the opportunity
for external infections.
We have demonstrated how genetic recombination
and species interactions significantly affect the emer-
gence and dynamics of influenza strains. The notion of
reoccurring epidemics is particularly important in that it
is specifically driven by species interaction and may
AB
CD
Fig. 5 Contour maps of the pigs-to-human contact transmissibility (gp) versus the super-transmissibility in humans (bh,2)(A) The figure
shows maximum number of super-strain over 200 years. The largest outbreaks occur when 2.3 <R0 < 3.8 (0.24 <bh,2 < 0.4). (B) The figure shows
the sum of yearly average super-strain cases over 200 years. The two maximal states occur when 2.5 <R0 < 3.0 (0.26 <bh,2 < 0.32) and 4.0 <R0 <
4.5 (0.42 <bh,2 < 0.48). (C) The figure shows the sum of yearly average super-strain cases over 500 years. The long-term cumulative incidence of
a super-strain is highest when either: 1.9 <R0 < 3.0, or 0 <R0 < 1.9 and a specified range of interaction for the given R0. (D) The figure shows the
sum of yearly average super-strain cases over 1000 years. The long-term cumulative incidence of a super-strain is highest when either: 1.9 <R0 <
3.0, or 0 <R0 < 1.9 and a specified range of interaction for the given R0.
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type many years after an epidemic. We recommend,
that in order to obtain further insights into the emer-
gence of influenza super-strains, strain subtypes should
be frequently monitored in the major host species (par-
ticularly, birds, humans, and pigs). In addition, we
recommend comparing various reassortants to identify
strains that are more likely to recombine, particularly
those that are infectious to humans.
A reassortant of the avian strain such as the H5N1
that can spread from human-to-human poses a great
threat, even when transmissibility is low (as shown in
our simulation). Although the chance of such an event
seems rare, situations like one described in the report
[13] on Java’s pigs suggest that not only is a super-strain
able to emerge but that such a strain is likely to emerge.
Our results suggest more careful surveillance of influ-
enza in pigs with a specific focus on detecting rare but
potentially dangerous recombination events. Unless a
global monitoring system is put in place, we will be
unable to recognize lurking novel strains that are cap-
able of the next pandemic. Most importantly, our mod-
eling shows the necessity of a global monitoring system
to track strain subtypes within different host species to
adequately forecast the next pandemic.
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Appendix
Multi-strain/multi-host model
We use the multi-strain/multi-host (MSMH) model to simulate the spread of
influenza in bird, pigs, and humans. Each species has a set of susceptible-
infectious-susceptible (SIS) type differential equations that govern the spread
of certain strains in that population. Moreover, some host species can infect
other species with specific strains, but this ability is generally not symmetric.
For example, birds can infect pigs with an avian strain, but the pigs cannot
pass the avian strain back into the avian population. All infections follow a
“mass action” structure, and recruitment is into the susceptible subclass, so
the birth term is logistic and based on the entire population. The three host
species are coupled by external inputs of avian and human strains from the
respective hosts to the pigs and a super-strain external input from the pigs
to the humans.
The subscripts b, p, and h denote birds, pigs, and humans, respectively.Si(t) is
the density of susceptibles for species i at time t; Ii,j(t) is the density of jth
infectious individuals for species i at time t; and Ji(t) is the density of super-
infectious individuals for species i at time t. b is the per capita incidence
rate, a is the recovery rate, v is the disease-induced mortality rate (virulence).
r is the intrinsic growth, K is the carrying capacity, and N is the total
population. More specifically, Nb=Sb+Ib, Np=Sp+Ip,1+Ip,2+Ip,12+Jp, and Nh=Sh+Ih
+Jh. δh is the super-transmission rate in which super-infectious humans Jh
infect individuals in the group Ih. Ψp is the rate at which co-infected pigs
become super-infected. gb and gh are the transmission rates in which birds
and humans infect pigs, respectively. gp the transmission rate super-
infectious pigs infect humans.
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Basic reproductive numbers
In this section, we calculate the basic reproductive numbers R0 for the MSMH
model. In general, R0 for an independent strain (i.e., when the MSMH model is
reduced to a species’ susceptibles and specified infectious individual) is
R
K
v
0 =
+
b
a
.
For example, the basic reproductive number for the independent super-
strain in humans is
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We calculate R0 for the MSMH model by using the methods for
compartmental models provided in [27]. We calculate about the disease-free
equilibrium point (Kb,0,Kp,0,0,0,0,Kh,0,0). The next-generation matrix (FV
-1)i s
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The basic reproductive number (i.e., the spectral radius of FV
-1) for the
MSMH model is
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which is the maximum basic reproductive number of the strains in the three
host populations.
Parameter values
To calibrate the human parameters, we set the parameter values for the two
strains in humans to reflect a seasonal strain and a transmissible avian strain
with the virulence of H5N1. We use data from Thailand because of the
surveillance of strains and the prevalence of the avian strain H5N1. To
determine the logistic growth parameters in humans, we use data for the
total population of Thailand [28,29]. We best-fit the data to the solution of
the logistic equation given by
pt
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using the method of least squares (Fig. S1). The parameters were
determined using iterative methods: Kh=87.3, Sh(0)=3.983, and rh=0.038. In a
study by the National Institute of Health in Thailand [22], case specimens of
influenza were taken from patients in 2004 and 2005. It was determined that
the numbers of cases of influenza-like illness for 2004 and 2005 were 21,176
and 21,351 per 100,000 people, respectively. The study also sampled
specimens for influenza type and subtype. We determined that the
incidence bh,1 for the endemic strain of influenza is 0.0253 and 0.0273 for
the years 2004 and 2005, respectively. The incidence bh,2 of the avian strain
H5N1 for 2004 was determined to be 0.00084. A summary report on
influenza in Asian countries from 1999 cites the annual mortality due to
pneumonia as 176 per 100,000 people [30], so we let the disease-induced
mortality rate be vh,1=0.00176 and the recovery rate ah,1=0.99824. The World
Health Organization (WHO) reported on June 2008 that the number of
confirmed cases due to H5N1 in Thailand was 25 and the number of deaths
was 17 [8], so let the disease-induced mortality of the super-strain to be
vh,2=0.68 and recovery rate ah,2=0.32.
To calibrate the pig parameters, we used data from the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) on pig populations
[31,32] and fit the data using the same methodology as in the humans (see
above). The parameters for the logistic growth term were determined to be
Kp=9.16, Sp(0)=0.002, and rp=0.093. Due to the limited data on influenza in
pigs, we assumed reasonable values (i.e., similar to the values for humans)
for the remaining parameters. We assumed the birds have the same
parameters as humans; that is, the single strain will have the same values as
the endemics strain in humans.
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